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by

Donald L. Snyder,
Associate Professor
and
Jay C. Andersen,
Professor

Department of Economics
Utah State University
Logan, Utah

INTRODUCTION
The rights associated with the use of water in the semi-arid regions
of the world are critical for agricultural, industrial, and municipal
exi stence, development, and expans i on.

Such is certa in 1y the case in the

western United States.
Miners, not farmers, were the first major group to claim a right to
water use in the American West.

These miners often built diversionary

structures and established a "use" for water for hydrolic mining.

It

appears that farmers "first in time, first in right" use of water was
viewed in the same manner as were "first in time, first in right" mining
claims (Western States Water Council, 1984).

The doctrine of prior

appropriation resulted from this tradition, to a great extent, and has
continued to receive the support of federal and state governments since
that time as evidenced by the Mining Act of 1866, Ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251
(1866), the Desert Land Act of 1877, Ch. 107,19 Stat. 377 (1877), and many

subsequent land settlement acts.
As a general rule, the property rights associated with the use of
water are similar to property rights consistent with those of other real
property.

Water rights can, in general, be bought and sold.

rights are registered and protected by law.
to higher valued uses over time.
may change, within some limits.

Title to such

This allows water to transfer

The physical location of actual water use
Still, there are differences in these

property rights which significantly influence water use and exchange.
First, the right to use water is not automatically granted into
perpetuity.

Technically, most states require that the water must be

continued to be put to beneficial use in order for the right to be acquired
and maintained. Thus far, as a practical matter, as long as the property
right holder is able to show any use, rights will 1 ikely be held by that
1

individual until a decision is made to sell.
Second, water rights are not associated with any specific water but,
instead,

wi th the ri ght to use a certa in quant i ty of water from a

particular source.

This is obviously necessary because of the fluid or

transitory characteristics of water.
Third, while water rights are transferable, movement of rights between
drainage areas is generally not allowed.

That is, a property right

associated with water use cannot generally be transferred into another
drainage area without a simultaneous transfer of actual water.
"NATIVE AMERICAN" WATER RIGHTS
Special classification has been given to two types of "Native
American" (Indian) water ri-ghts:

"aboriginal" and "reserved." Aboriginal

water ri ghts are those ri ghts whi ch follow a "fi rst in time, fi rst in
right" philosophy.
Indians

An aboriginal right is assumed to exist for- those

for whom the use of water in farming or domestic activities can be

historically documented and tied to a specific geographic location.

While

many of the American Indian tribes were nomadic, some did practice farming
on a regular basis and maintained those activities in a specific geographic
area.

Since those activities pre-dated most, if not all other current

uses, there is some justification of a IIfirst in time, first in right" or
aboriginal award.

While there is often some difficulty involved in

establ i shi ng the exact nature and extent of water use by such tri bes or
groups, the perfection of these rights generally does not require any
extensive economic analysis.

Historical documents are most often relied on

in making a determination of aboriginal rights.
"Reserved" rights are also also related to a "first in time, first in
right" philosophy, but the quantification is much more complex.
2

A reserved

right is said to apply to those Indians who, though not historically a
stationary people,

were placed on a reservation or area of land,

specifically set aside for their long-term use.

The claim has been made

that there was an implicit awarding of water rights on the reservation at
the time of its creation.
establishment determine the

In general, the dates of the reservation

-----priority

date for water rights perfection if

the Indians can qualify for a reserved right.
In response to many of the early land development and settlement acts
passed in the United States during the 19th century and early part of the
20th century, 1ands were settl ed throughout the water-short West.

Early

claims to land (and water) were generally established in those areas which
adjoi ned "fl owi ng" streams, accordi ng to states or terri tori a1 water 1aw.
Little groundwater was appropriated during the period.

These settled lands

were either brought into agricultural production or existing production was
modified through the extensive use of irrigation techniques.
The development of lands which Indians had formerly intermittently
used coincided with, and contributed to, the establishment of Indian
reservations.

These reservations were established by treaty.

Later

modifications in or abandonment of these treaties caused that Indian lands
were en 1arged, reduced, eli mi nated or otherw i se changed.

The acqu is it ion

of public lands (and water) continued unabated until the early part of the
20th century.

As lands and water were acquired by non-Indians, the

potential for conflict increased.
In 1906, the u.S. Government brought su it aga i nst pri vate 1andowners
living below the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana on behalf of
the Indians claiming that all of the water in the Milk River was
appropri atel y the property of the Ind i ans and was necessary for meet i ng

3

reservation purposes.

While the resolution of the issue might have been

very simple had Congress simply granted certain water rights when the
various reservations were established, such was not the case.
The defendants (non-Indian landholders) claimed that they held valid
water rights under Montana State law and were beneficially using a
considerable amount of water for farming and ranching purposes.

The

defendants alleged that the states had, after all, been given the right to
regulate or control the use of in-state water by the Federal Government.
The issue of Indian water rights was, consequently, left to the courts
to be resol ved.

In 1908, the u.S. Supreme Court rul ed that all

reservations had a Ilreservedll right to water because Congress had certainly
intended to reserve water for an Indian reservation at the time of its
creation (Winters v. United States, 1908).

Such a position was taken by

the Court because water was considered a prerequisite to the development of
vir t uall y all West ern 1and s , I nd ian 1 an dsin c 1 ude d . Wh i 1e the Su pre me
Court appeared to settl e the issue of "reserved ll ri ght, they fa i 1 ed to
suggest or select a method by which that water right could be quantified.
Hence, the question of quantity accompanying such reserved rights was left
open for future debate.
In subsequent court decisions (Arizona v. California (1963); Tuttle
(1982); and Roncolio (1982)), a quantification process and standard has
emerged.

The overall standard is Ilpracticably irrigable acreage" or PIA.

In essence, the standard suggests that the quantity of reserved rights to
be acquired by a tribe depends on the amount of practicably irrigable
acreage that can be shown to exist on the reservation.

Traditionally, PIA

has been demonstrated through the extensive use of economic anlayses.
Included in the process of rights perfection under a PIA standard are
numerous non-economic issues.

First, the date of reservation establishment
4

is critical in determining the award since individuals perfecting water
rights prior to the date of reservation establishment have priority over
reservation uses.

Second, the claim cannot technically exceed the water

available so the physical volume and associated hydrology of the water
basin must be determined.

Third, the right is apparently tied to the

purpose(s) for which the reservation was originally established.

For

instance, if the primary purpose of the reservation was farming, then
farming would be considered the activity on which to base the
quantification process.

On the other hand, if grazing were the primary

purpose of reservation establishment, then presumably the quantification
would be based on grazing uses.

Because of the many changes in reservation

boundari es through time, these issues must be resolved for each add it ion
and/or change in the boundary.

A portion of the reservation may have been

established for farming purposes; a later portion added for grazing.

Under

a strict interpretation of purpose and time standards, each area would have
to individually be quantified on the basis of purpose and time.

It is

presumed that if the pri mary purpose of the reservat i on were recreat ion,
then recreation activities would provide the basis for the evaluation.
However, it does not appear that recreation or industrial developments were
ever considered as the primary purposes for which the reservations were
established (Arizona v. California, 1963).
Assuming that farming was the primary purpose for which the
reservation was established, additional criteria must then be met.

First,

it must be shown that it is technically possible to irrigate the lands in
question using current practices. Second, agronomic feasibility or the
physical ability to produce various crops must be demonstrated.

Agronomic

feas i bi 1i ty is cont i ngent upon the app 1 i cat i on of today's eng i neeri ng and
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agronomic technologies.

The irrigation system must be designed, crops

selected, agronomic practices specified, and yields determined.

Once these

issues are settled, only then a determination must be made as to the
economic feasibility or viability of the farming operation.
Each of these steps can result in complex and extended litigation.
Yet, when all is said and done, an award of reserved water right based on
the concept of practicably irrigable acreage depends, to a significant
degree, on the outcome of an economic analysis.

As noted in past cases,

the concept of PIA requires that the Indians demonstrate that the water can
be put to a beneficial use in purposes for which the reservation was
estab 1 i shed.

I n essence, benefi cia 1 use has genera 11 y been interpreted by

the courts to mean that benefits must exceed costs.

To the extent that

crop production can pay for the necessary water development (assuming all
other conditions are met), the Indians are granted the right to that amount
of water.
A very simple example might serve to more clearly illustrate the
appl ication of this standard of measurement.

Assume that a reservation

contained 25,000 acres of irrigable land which, if irrigated properly and
completely, would require 75,000 acre feet of water.

Furthermore, assume

that it is technically possible to irrigate all those lands.

It has been

demonstrated that production is possible on that acreage for a large number
of crops.

Finally, assume that the Indians can pay for the associated

development costs including, but not limited to, land leveling, dams,
ditches, fences, roads, buildings and equipment.

The Indians have

demonstrated, under the standard of PIA, that the land is capable of being
farmed in an economical or cost-effective manner.

Revenues earned from the

production of the crops exceed the costs associated with crop production.
Therefore, the necessary rights are granted.
6

Once granted, these reserved rights are not totally consistent with
water rights perfected by others, however.

First, while the quantification

process is loosely based on the notion of beneficial use, there is no
requirement that beneficial use actually be made of the water once
acquired.

In fact, there does not appear to be any restriction on what the

final use may be on the reservation once the size of the award has been
determined.

Furthermore, these rights may not be terminated by abandonment

or forfeiture.

There is no way, short of action by Congress, that a

reserved water right can be withdrawn for application to a non-beneficial
use, illegal use, or even a total lack of use.
remains with the tribe into perpetuity.

Once awarded, the right

Third, it does not appear that the

property right can be transferred off the reservation.

Thus far, it

appears that water is awarded on the same basis as reservation land.

It is

to be held in "reserve" for present and future generations of Indians and
cannot be sold.

Fourth, the Courts have not required that any form of

compensation be granted to those parties having to forfeit their rights to
water use.

The transfer is made without incurring any explicit costs.

In recent court cases, (Arizona v. California, 1963; Tuttle, 1982; and
Roncol io, 1982) a fifth condition, a "sensitivity doctrine," has emerged.
The doctrine states, in its most simplistic form, that the Court must
consider losses elsewhere in making its decision regarding the amount to be
awarded to Indians under the reserved doctrine.

While not universally

accepted as a point of law, it does appear that the sensitivity doctrine
plays some role in the final determination of water rights.
THE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM
The major problem with "reserved" and "aboriginal" water rights as
outlined above is simply that most of the streams are fully appropriated at
7

the present time.
overappropriated.

Many, such as the Gila River in Arizona, are

There is simply not enough water in the various streams

and ri vers to accommodate exi st i ng appropri ated ri ghts, much 1ess newl y
determined and granted rights.

Consequently, if an award is made to the

Indians on the basis of aboriginal use or a reserved right, present users
will be denied use.

In many cases, there will be a gallon-for-gallon

reduct i on to others.
A summary of potential claims for reserved rights only is shown in
Table 1 (Western States Water Council, 1984).

The summary included here is

not intended as a precise estimate of claims that will be made nor a
suggestion that they should.

The summary is intended only as an overview

of the quantity of potential Indian water claims.

Application of the PIA

standard to the potent i all y i rri gabl e acres 1 i st for some of the states
would probably result in a smaller award of water rights than the potential
cl aim suggests.

However, because of the 1 ack of ava i 1 abl e data, no

irrigable acreage or potenti'al claim is made for many reservations, some
with very large gross acreages.

Also, few Indian claims for fisheries,

natural resource or industrial developments, recreation, or aboriginal
rights are included.
Total claims equal nearly 45.9 mill ion acre-feet per year. This is
equal to 3.5 times the average annual flow of the Klamath or Colorado
rivers and more than five times the flow of the Flathead or Salmon Rivers.
It is nearly twenty-five times the annual flow of the San Juan or Yuba
Rivers and equal to roughly 1.5 times the storage capacity of Lake Powell
or Lake Mead.
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Table 1.

State by State Summary of Potential Indian Reserved Water Claims

BIA Area, BIA
Agency Juri sdiction

~

Gross
Area
in Acres

Presently
Irr'i gated
Acres

Potentially
Irrigable
Acres

Other
Estimate
of Water
Needs

Potential
Claim
AcFt/Yr

Alaska
Arizona
California

(7)
(20)
( 80)

386,142.19
19,808,056.88
583.235.34

0
188,410
14,741

0
6,516,208
58,665

0
18,034,825
0

0
31,273,343
269,282

Colorado
Idaho
Montana

(2)
(5)
( 7)

755,399. 71
826,863.26
5,224,864.06

0
102,229
10.2,338

93,000
227,417
450,000

0
0
3,993,872

0
762, 721
6,632,902

Nebras ka
Nevada
New Mexico

(4)
(24)
( 26)

64,475.70
1,154,109.89
7,408,225.35

14,482
24,670
74,297

0
0
17,309

26,481
210,556.06
328,332.6

N. Dakota
Oregon
S. Dakota

(6)
(3)
(9)

851,925.99
757,362.54
5,091,218.73

0
1,800

0
0
0

190,045.03
450,000
1, 269, 306. 37

Utah
Washington
Wyoming

(5 )
(23)
(1 )

2,283,986.00
2,496,422.89
1, 888, 031 • 81

3,175
165,000
0

SOURCE:

0
34,442.34
13,846

°

6.6,62-6. 51
100,000
439,797.49
172,520
435,000
103,000

481,078
0
0

630,007
3,371,805
477,292

Western States Water Council. 1984. "Indian Water Rights in the West."
prepared for the Western Go~ernors' Association. May.

Study

"

The state with the largest potential claim is Arizona.

As Figure 1

illustrates, Arizona's dependable water supply pales in comparison.

In the

other states, the proport ions refl ected in the fi gure woul d be reversed
somewhat in that potential Indian claims would be a fraction of the
dependable water supply in most other states.

However, the real issue even

in states for which a smaller share of water is to be affected is that
there is little, if any, water available to new users.
appropriated.

The water has been

In light of the possible consequences associated with water

Mi 1. Ga 1 .

35
30

25

Potential Indian water
claims

20
15
10

Dependable water
supply in Arizona

5

o
Figure 1.

Comparison of potential Indian water claims and
dependable water supply in Arizona.
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right transfers, it is amazing that little specific legal guidance has been
given regarding the techniques to be employed in the quantification
process.

The major unresolved issues with respect to a determination of

reserved water rights under a PIA standard is the methodology with which
the claimed reserved rights will be determined and perfected and the impact
on society as a whole of such transfers.
It may be argued that, in the case of reserved water rights, the law
is being applied in an attempt to protect or recapture a lost property
right.

While it is true that the courts would protect the rights of any

water user presently abused, Indian rights included, it should also be
noted that in the case of any other water right holder, that the non-Indian
holder (or predecessor) took an active role in the acquisition and
development of the property right.

Such cannot be said for the Indians.

While some Indian tribes have acquired water rights on the same basis as
any other water right holder (by making application through the appropriate
state agency), the majority of Indian tribes have not taken any action, nor
has the Federal Government as trustee for the tribes, except for the
limited number of lawsuits thus far conducted by the U.S. on behalf of the
tribes.

The difference between the court protecting the right of a private

citizen who developed (or purchased the right to use water) may be
conceptually different from that of the Indians wherein no effort was made
to acquire the necessary water rights.

Neither the Federal Government, in

its trust responsibility, nor the Indians themselves have attempted to
mitigate the situation they suddenly find themselves in,
exceptions.

with few

While a question may be raised regarding the responsibility of

the Indians or Federal government to mitigate adverse impacts of offreservation water development, that is primarily a legal question and one
that cannot be answered here.
11

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
While economic analysis may have a limited role in the determination
of aboriginal water rights, it appears that such rights are more of a
historical and legal matter rather than an economic one.

Hence, this

discussion will be limited to that dealing with reserved water rights.
With the Court's decisions regarding reserved water rights, it might
be concluded that the perfection of reserved rights would proceed very
rapidly with a minimum effort and cost.
case.

Such has, however, not been the

Litigation on a specific case may extend over several years and cost

millions of dollars.
We would suggest that there are three realms wherein problems may lie
with respect to extended and costly litigation.

First, a major function,

it appears, of litigation is to attempt to instigate a change in the rules
to make the standard or precedent more favorable to one side or the other.
Once again, this is a legal matter or, at the very least, part of the legal
system.

As such, it lies outside the breadth of this paper.

The other two

problems with respect to the economic issues, (conceptual matters and
empirical applications), are within the scope of this paper. First, at the
conceptual level, we have identified eight areas where economic
concepts may impact the outcome of an "econom i cIt anal ys is.
empirical level, seven areas have been identified.

t~eory

or

Second, at the

Some topics are common

to both the conceptual and empirical levels and are discussed accordingly.
Conceptual Issues
The first conceptual issue is that of society's welfare.

In the most

basic sense, society's welfare is improved as long as some action results
in at least one member of society being made better off without any other
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member being made worse off.

As soon as no other transfer can be made

which improves someone's position without adversely impacting anyone else',
then the system is sa i d to be "Pareto" effi ci ent.

Compensat i on mayor may

not actually be required but the full impacts are identified.

Free markets

or an omniscient government might bring Pareto efficiency about.

In a free

market, where property rights were completely transferable and goods were
scarce, a resource would shift to its highest valued use(s).
determination of gains and losses is difficult, at best.

A

Yet, at a

conceptual level, any mandated shifts in resource use without a
consideration of net gains/losses to all parties involved will not insure
that society remains even as well off as they were prior to any changes in
ditribution.
It may be argued that the market for water rights is a reasonably
well-functioning market and, as such, would allow water to move to its
highest valued use(s).

In this regard, it should be noted that nothing has

prevented the Indians from making a claim for water rights through the
usual process outlined by the various states over time.
in fact,

Some tribes have,

made appl ication for and received water rights under the

appropriate state jurisdiction.

In general, we would suggest that the

water has historically been employed in its most productive use(s).

If

such water rights (and the accompanying water) is suddenly transferred
without an accompanying demonstration that the water will be put to
benefi cia 1 use, then soc i ety is c1earl y worse off.

That the I nd i ans have

not perfected rights to water would suggest that higher valued uses already
exist and are being used.
The second conceptual issue is that of risk.

The removal of a

valuable resource without accompanying strict assurances that the resource
will be put to a similarly valued (or higher valued) use would suggest a
13

reduction is society's welfare.

This implies an increased risk to society

should the transfer take place.

This point is particularly relevant since

even though the present quantification standard is based on beneficial use,
no requirement is imposed that such use actually has to occur nor that
beneficial use on the reservation be as high or higher than existing offreservation uses.
Furthermore, there is the d i st i nct poss i bi 1 i ty that water, once
assigned through a reserved right proceeding, will never be allowed to reenter the market regardless of the gain or loss to society (Roncolio,
1982).

A transfer in water outside of any workable market would suggest

that water woul d not be ava i 1 abl e for other purposes at a 1 ater poi nt in
time.

If the

water is to be held in reserve in the same sense as

reservation land in a sense that it cannot be bought and sold, society's
risk would increase.

Given the increased risk associated with such a

.-

transfer, strict evaluation procedures would need to be used to insure that
such transfers are cost effective.
The third conceptual issue involves the very nature of the analysis.
Calculation of benefits and costs may follow two distinct approaches:
financial or economic.

The courts have recognized the differences between

these two conceptual approaches.

The Special master in California vs.

Arizona (Tuttle, 1982) stated the following:

"For present purposes, a

finding that annual benefits exceed costs will suffice for a finding of
practicable irrigability."
1983,

In response to that statement, Burness, et al.,

indicate that this conclusion on the part of the Master was

consistent with economic analysis as opposed to financial analysis.
suggested that,

14

They

"Thus, economic feasibility is established as the means for
demonstrating practicably irrigable acreage which, in turn,
serves to quant i fy water reserved to the tri bes.
1I

Economic analysi sis based on the concept of opportunity cost.

In

using an economic analysis, it is imperative that the true opportunity cost
of resources be determined and used.

The true opportunity cost of a

resource is simply the value that must be foregone if that resource is used
in another process.

For instance, the true opportunity cost of using water

in agriculture is the value that the water in alternative uses.

This

concept is so basic to economic analysis that it is taught in virtually
every introductory economics textbook.

The use of economic analysis

requires the adoption and correct application of opportunity cost to each
and every resource being considered in a production process.
The fourth conceptual problem, related to the first three, is that of
an uncompensated transfer of water (and wealth).

The argument is sometimes

advanced that if water was subsidized during early development, then there
may not be any significant impact to society should that water be simply
transferred without compensation.

However, this ignores any change in the

value of that water that may have occurred over time because of changes in
technologies.
Assume that a current water right owner purchased that right in recent
times.

The price paid for that water would represent its current value in

production, assuming a reasonably, well-functioning market.

It would most

clearly represent a higher value than the price (if any) originally paid
for the water given historical changes in related technologies.

To make a

transfer without due compensation brings about a redistribution of wealth.
The party who originally gained through water development will likely not
be the one to suffer the consequences of the water transfer.

However, even

if they were, there is some loss that will be incurred because other
15

investments have been made by the impacted party in order to enhance water
productivity.

But this issue is not simply as issue of whether

compensation should or should not be granted.
In assessing whether a transfer should take place, even if a legal or
political decision were made that compensation would not be required, the
true opportunity cost of that water must be measured or evaluated in
conducting an economic feasibility analysis.

There is a real cost

associated with the transfer of that water, even should compensation never
be made.

That cost must be identified and accounted for.

free good.

Water is not a

Consequently, in making a determination of economic

feasibility, it is imperative that the true opportunity cost of that water
be included in the analysis if economic analysis is to be the basis from
which all the calculations are made.
The fifth issue is that of time.

Reservations were established in the

past, as were appropriated water rights.

Water rights are, however, being

evaluated for transfer in the present based on some present and future
needs.

Area 11 ocat i on wi 11 impact present and future generat ions of both

sides.

Admittedly, there is an opportunity cost to those impacted by the

reassignment -- today and tomorrow.

That must include the increase in

welfare experienced by the Indians as well as the decrease in welfare
experienced by those who must give that water up.
It may be argued that those living in the past were adversely impacted
by past and present water rights assignments.

It is, however, unl ikely

that a change in today's assignment will make those who lived previously
any better off!

Therefore, we would suggest that the analysis must focus

on those impacted in the present time period and, possibly, those which may
be impacted in a future time period, though such determinations are nearly

16

impossible to make since future generations are not here to make their
wishes known.

A determination of benefits and costs can be done in today's

terms, with some consideration of the benefits and costs to future
generations.
The sixth conceptual issue is that of an appropriate discount rate to
use in the discounting/compounding process.

In "reserved" water right

cases, a benefit-cost analysis has been used to determine whether benefits
exceed costs for the project/development inquest ion. _ Benefi ts and costs
occurring in different time periods are brought to a comparable basis
through the process of discounting.

This is a well-recognized practice in

project evaluation. The difficult issue is to determine the appropriate
rate to be used or employed in the discounting process.

In order that this

portion of the analysis be consistent with the others, the opportunity cost
of capital is the correct conceptual approach to adopt.
What must be given up in order for a transfer of financial capital to
take place? Certainly, current production, consumption, and government
spending must be foregone if a transfer takes place.

Note that the correct

opportunity cost cannot be limited just to the lost opportunities in
business and government.

Today's consumption is also foregone and its

opportunity cost must be included in the calculation.
generations are impacted.

In addition, future

As a conceptual matter, it should be noted that

both present and future generat ions of those who ga in and those who lose
must be considered.

Consequently, an appropriate discount rate to use

would be one that reflected opportunities foregone today, as well as
opportunities foregone tomorrow.

Therefore, present and future

opportunities foregone becomes that standard -- not just the future, nor
just the present; not just to those who gain, but also those who lose; not
just business or government, but businesses, government, and consumers.
17

It seems appropriate to also suggest that opportunities foregone in
the past are not relevant to the analysis since such opportunities would
presumably have been undertaken had the benefits actually exceeded the
costs.

Once again, the fact that such acquisitions did not take place, as

a general rule, would suggest that few opportunities were foregone in the
past.
A seventh conceptual point has to do with the incidence of both
primary and secondary benefits and costs.

As is the case with most

deve 1opment projects, the benefi ts and costs (both pri mary and secondary)
are not al ways real ized by the same group of people or even in the same
geographic area.

Consequently, some area or group may receive the benefits

yet have none of the costs imposed.

Alternatively, another group may incur

virtually all of the costs, yet receive few if any of the benefits.

If a

transfer of wealth is to take place, then the losses and gains to all
parties involved must be accounted for.

Unless all benefits and costs are

accounted for (primary or secondary), any potential development project
could be shown to be viable by excluding some or all of the costs.
It would appear that a consideration of all benefits and costs is even
more critical in this situation where it can be said that those who lose
their water right did nothing of themselves to deny the Indians their water
rights.
they,

That the Indians did not receive some water would suggest that
or the U.s. acting as their trustee,

respons i bi 1it i es.

were negl igent in their

The current approach places the ent ire fi nanc i alb 1arne

those who were doing exactly what that same Federal Government was
encouraging them to do -- settle the Western lands through an appropriation
of water.
Economic analysis is conducted so that all benefits and costs can be
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enumerated and the resulting calculations made.

Those calculations may be

expressed in a benefit-cost ratio as in the case of reserved water rights.
Other noneconomic forms of evaluation may not require as explicit
accounting of all costs and benefits.

However, if economic (benefit-cost)

analysis is to be the yardstick by which reserved water rights are to be
made, then it must be recognized that there is a potential for three
poss i b1e outcomes.

First, all benefi ts may exceed all costs (B/C > 1) and

the transfer woul d be effi c i ent. Second, all benefi ts may equal all costs
(B/C = 1) and the transfer mayor may not be appropriate.

Third, and the

most critical in understanding the implications of an economic analysis,
all benefits may be exceeded by all costs (B/C < 1) and the transfer could
not be justified on economic terms.

If the courts (and other parties

involved) are not willing to recognize and submit to the possibility of
these three outcomes, then econom i c anal ys is is an i nappropri ate anal ys is
to follow in determining the quantity of reserved water rights.
An eighth conceptual issue focuses on the term "equity." The claim
has been made that, from a conceptual point, equity requires that the
Indians be given considerations above those given to others involved or
impacted by the transfer.

First, it must be recognized that economics elas

with questions of efficiency not equity.

Efficiency is the realm in which

economics can provide objective, meaningful analysis.

Economists can

provide information concerning the impacts of various transfers to all
parties inovlved.
another matter.

Whether such transfers are equitable, however, is

Still, equity implies certain criterion that can be used

in evaluating such transfers.

"Equity" is defined as 'freedom from bias or

favoritism' (Merriam-Webster, 1983).

Some authors (Burness, et al., 1983)

have argued that certain rules of evaluation need to be changed in order to
insure that the Indians are treated equitably.
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To adjust the rules by

which the rest of society is evaluated or to view gains to the Indians
without also considering losses occuring elsewhere hardly seems consistent
with the concept of equity as expressed above.

Is it appropriate to argue

'equity' from a single position?
Empirical Issues.
There are a host of areas where changes in empirical approaches can
modify the results of a benefit-cost analysis.

Interestingly enough, one

of the most basic divergences has been a failure to understand the
difference between economic and financial analysis.

In its most basic

form, economic analysis requires an examination of all explicit and
implicit benefits and costs associated with a particular project or
activity.

Financial analysis, on the other hand, requires only that out-

of-pocket or explicit costs be accounted for.

Financi'al analysis, for the

most part, ignores the full concept of opportun i ty cost.

If,

as

suggeste€i

above, economic analysis is the appropriate analysis to use (and that view
appears to be one accepted by the courts) then it must be used consistently
throughout the analysis.

a national prespective may not be required in an

economic analysis -- but a perspective broad enough to consider all costs
and benefits is necessary.
The second empirical issue is the use of standardized and generally
accepted project evaluation practices.

Project feasibility analysis

actually began in the U.S. in the 1 ate 1800's.

From the begi nni ng,

projects have been analyzed following what was determined to be the stateof-the-art in economic theory and application at a point in time.

These

standards have changed through time as more conceptually sound and
emp i ri call y accurate measurement methods and techno log i es were found.

In

fact, current and past project evaluation standards have evolved from only
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the

most

bas i c pri nci pl es

instruct ions/procedures.

into a set of reasonabl e and manageabl e

It woul d,

therefore,

appear reasonabl e to value

proposed projects or developments involving reserved water rights with
present evaluation standards, such as reflected in the 1983 Principles and
Guidel ines (U.S. Water Resources Council, 1983).

In fact, the federal

government has mandated the use of these standards in project evaluation
for Indian projects (U.S. Department of Interior,

1980) as well as others.

However, even had no such standards been mandated for the Indi ans, they
would be the most appropriate ones to use for several reasons.
represent

First, they

the latest consensus in appropriate evaluation techniques.

Second, they reflect economic theory as nearly as is possible with today's
technology.

Third, all other engineering and agronomic standards are

measured in today's or the current period terms.
Burness, et al., }980, have suggested that changes in the standards
since they first were applied to project analysis preclude their use in
current project analysis, particularly with respect to Indian Reserved
Water Rights 1 itigation.

Of course, all currently approved projects must

also abide by these same standards.

Furthermore, it is interesting to note

that all other techno log i es and standards (eng i neeri ng,

agronom i c,

soil s, hydrologic, etc.) are considered in the present time period.

1 ega 1,
That

is, only current technologies are considered in making a determination of
reserved water rights.

Past irrigation technologies are not utilized, nor

are past agronomic practices.

If such were to be used, the number of acres

that could potentially irrigated and the quantity of yields under older
vari et i es and agronom i c pract ices woul d 1 ike 1y make econom i c feas i bi 1 i ty
even more d i ffi cul t to achi eve.
matter,

As an empi ri ca 1, as well as conceptua 1

if current technologies are to be used to evaluate project
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feasibility, then current economic practices should also be used.
The third empirical issue is the treatment of labor costs in project
analysis.

From

a conceptual basis, labor cost should be included

consistent with the opportunity cost of that labor.

It has been suggested

that because Indians generally live in areas and cultures with high rates
of unemployment, there should not be any labor cost assessed against the
project.

The use of zero 1 abor costs is not very compell i ng from ei ther

and conceptual or an empirical basis.
Due to di fferences in job requirements, 1 abor mobil ity, and job
duration, there are really two labor issues involved in any project -- its
construction and operation.

Because these two activities have differing

labor demands (in a skill as well as a temporal sense) it is clear that
there is justification for treating them differently.
is generally short-term.

Construction labor

On-the-job training does not really provide the

laborers with permanent, transferable job skills.

Only if the labor is

perfectly mobile, which seems unlikely on a Indian reservation, could that
labor take advantage of continuing employment possibil ities.

Hence, it

would seem appropriate that the opportunity cost of some labor during
construction be valued at less than some current market wage rate.
However, it is also obvious that the opportunity cost of that labor is
not zero.

Indians have alternative uses of their time.

Hunting, fishing,

religious ceremonies, and numerous other similar activities constitute a
significant portion of Indian society.

Those activities involve labor and

because they choose to participate in some non-work activities, the
opportunity cost of that labor cannot be said to equal zero.
The opportunity cost of that labor should be valued at the wage rate
at which the Indians would agree to work in the type of employment
resulting from a construction activity.

If they were to go to work for
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$4/hour, then that become the opportunity cost of their labor.

to this in

a slightly different way, if Indians are not willing to work fo r$O.25/hour
but are willing to work only when the wage rate reaches $4/hour, then
$4/hour represents the opportunity cost of the next best alternative.

This

concept may be referred to as a "wi thhol di ng pri ce" threshhol d.
Note, however,

that valuing labor cost at $4/hour ignores the loss to

other workers, who previously had been working on similar projects, would
now become unemployed because of that I nd ian's work.

The actual benefi t

attributable to a project would be that portion of the wages/income above
that lost elsewhere.

Only in instances of significant national

unemployment could such benefits be credited outright during the
construction of a project.
The present version of the principles and guidelines, (U.S. Water
Resources Council, 1983) does allow for the inclusion of labor benefits
duri ng a project's construct i on phase.

Even in these standards, however,

the benefits are limited to those workers who would have been previously
unemployed.
done.

This implies that some matching of jobs and skills levels be

Were the proper investigation made, it is conceivable that some

labor benefits could be counted during project construction in conformance
with present evaluation guidelines, although it is _obvious that the
opportunity cost of previously employed workers is not equal to zero.
A second type of employment issue is labor used during project
operation.

It can be treated differently for several reasons.

First,

skills learned during project operation are assumed to have a more lasting
benefit because project operation is expected to continue for several
years. Second, such ski 11 s are more eas i ly transferred since those same
type of jobs are generally available in other parts of most regional/local
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economies.

Third, there may be other employment opportunities on the

project over time and if personnel are promoted or reassigned, then there
is a cost involved in finding and training their replacement.

Finally,

there is a problem of valuing "leisure" time (time engaged in activities
other than "work").

The current standards for project evaluation do not

allow for the inclusion of labor benefits during project operation.

This

exclusion of labor benefits during project operation also applies to Indian
projects (U.S. Department of Interior, 1980).
In addition to the problems associated with an empirical estimate of
the value of non-work time, there is a substantial empirical problem
associated with the treatment of underemployed labor vs. unemployed labor.
In the process of P&G development, it was noted that some decisions
relative to the treatment of labor values were arbitrary in the sense that
empirical measurement was nearly impossible to make.

The standard included

in the Principles and Guidelines likely underestimate some of the benefits
derived from employing underemployed or unemployed labor and overestimate
other labor benefits.

It is,

in a sense,

a compromise given the

uncerta i nt i es assoc i ated with empi ri cal measurement. . Unt i 1 such time as
empirical technqiues allows for a more accurate quantification of labor
benefits, the generally accepted evaluation techniques such as reflected in
the 1983 Principles and Guidelines (U.S. Water Resources Council, 1983)
remain the best available.
To assume that the cost of Indi an 1 abor is zero for the ent ire 50 or
100 year life of project operation implicitly assumes that the Indians
never will gain any transferable skills during their lifetimes (or the
1 ifetimes of their children and children's children).

If the purpose of

the granting of a reserved water right is to meet the tribes need and to
provide an improvement in their social well-being, then the use of a zero
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wage cost during operation would appear to add insult to injury.

What is

being suggested is either that the Indians will never gain and useful
skills or that they will never be able to compete with others in society
for available jobs.

It may also suggest, that they will always be a people

without employemnt opportunities either on or off the reservations.

That

is, to say the least, not a particularly cheerful outlook.
A fourth empirical issue is the level and type of activities often
inc 1uded in the anal ys is.

For instance, it may be unreasonable to include

the production of strawberries, raspberries, or asparagus in an area where
there has not been any commercial production of those commodities unless a
definitive analysis can show or illustrate that there is some basis for the
existence of a comparative advantage in that area.

This may include a

comparative advantage in production, processing, and/or marketing.

Unless

i t E: an bed e m0 ns t rat edt hat a par tic uJ a r are a has so mer e a1 ad van tag e i n
pr0duction, processing, or marketing, it cannot be reasonably assumed that
production will leave any exi'sting production area.

Furthermore, such an

analysis effeE:tively ignores the impact that demand has on the production
and consumption of many commodities.

Second, if such

a strong

comparative

advantage exists, why is production not already occurring in an area?

Food

(or recreation or minerals or virtually anything else) production occurs in
a particular location because, in the long run, there is some profit to be
made.

The absence of production in an area may be the strongest evidence

that no comparative advantage exists.

Even in the event that similar

products are grown and sold within the project area, does this justify that
crop's automatic inclusion in the crop mix?

Not necessarily.

Unless it

can be demonstrated that there is a shortage of land from which that
increase in "incremental" production might come from, market forces would
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suggest that supply equals demand and any increased production would reduce
price.

Furthermore, even if it could be demonstrated that a shortage of

appropriate land existed, an inordinate amount of increase could also
effectively reduce the price received by the producers of that commodity.
Hence, comparat i ve advantage and ana lys is of exi st i ng demand play a very
1arge rol e in the determi nat i on of appropri ate new crops. Any increase
would be felt in decreased prices on and off the proposed project.
As a result of these considerations and past abuses, limits are placed
on the amount of "non-basic" crops that can be included in a project under
the 1983 Principles and Guidelines (U.S. Water Resources Council, 1983).
(Basic crops are the 10 most sidely grown crops in the country.)

This

rule is not as arbitrary as it may seem for the reasons cited above.
Because there is rarely an evidence of a shortage of available lands on
which to produce such commodities, it must be assumed that the 1 imiting
factor is demand not supply.

Consequently, unless it can be demonstrated

that land is a limiting or constraining factor, net retur.ns or benefits
from only the 10 basic crops can be considered in project analysis.
Certain benefits from others crop can also be included.

However, the

benefi t whi ch can be cl aimed from the product i on of these other crops is
limited to that which would be in excess of that which could be earned
elsewhere.

This, in effect, does make an allowance for whatever aspect of

comparative advantage is relevant.

This discussion assumes that inputs are

valued at their full opportunity cost.

Admittedly, if costs on a new

project are subsidized sufficiently and a financial analysis is used (only
explicit costs are accounted for), then a comparative advantage may be
suggested where none, in fact, exists.

A complete economic analysis would

insure that comparative advantage (or disadvantage) would be clearly shown.
Related to the discussion of the type of activities to be included is
26

the level of their inclusion.

For example, while apple production has

historically been practiced in a given area, if additional production were
to increase area or state or regional production by two or three times,
some price effect would almost certainly be felt.
be difficult to quantify.

The exact impact would

In response to this problem the P&G's limit

additional agricultural production to the same proportion of various crops
as presently exists in an area.

While not allowing an exact quantification

of the price and quantity effect, the standards do provide a technique that
i s easy to apply and that would be expected to ""1 i mit the error of
estimation/calculation and provide a less costly means by which an answer
can be arri ved at.
The fifth empirical issue is the geographic extent to which benefits
and costs apply.

Project feasibility viewed from a single position or

geographic area cannot be -presumed to capture the full economic costs of an
action.

Furthermore, it is not obvious that an economic analysis is

approppriate were the analysis is isolated to a specific area.

As noted

above, it ts not unusual for project costs to be realized by different
individuals and/or areas than those enjoying project benefits.

One could

virtually guarantee that the localized benefits would exceed localized
costs in any event by simply adjusting the boundaries (geographic or
population) associated with the development.

Hence, there is no need for

an economic analysis if one can insure that the benefits will exceed the
costs by simply adjusting the population or geographic boundaries.
Interestingly enough, current evaluation standards recognize this problem.
They require that national benefits and costs be calculated and then they
allow for the calculation of regional impacts.

That way, national vs.

regional impacts are clearly distinguished and the resulting impacts to
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individuals are readily identified.
An issue closely related to that of the geographic dispersion of
benefits and costs is that of the inclusion of secondary benefits and
costs.

Conceptually, it would make no difference if secondary benefits

were included in the anal ys is as long as secondary costs, where ever they
occurred, were a 1 so i dent i fi ed.

Est i mates of secondary impacts are

generally derived through the use of some sort of an income or output
mul t i pl i ers.

It may be appropri ate to di spl ay those impacts, costs, as

well as benefits.

However, these values certainly have no place in a

benefit-cost ratio.
A sixth empirical issue is that of the appropriate discount rate to
use in economic analyses.

Suggestions for an appropriate discount rate to

be used in such analysis include the present opportunity cost of capital, a
zero opportunity cost of capital, or some range of rates.

While a specific

number may be difficult to determine, it should be based on the following
facts.

First, any project that is approved will require funds from present

as well as future generati ons.

There is no doubt but there is an

intergenerational impact associated with such proposed developments and/or
the transfer of water rights.

Second, use of funds to justify a project

implies that today's and tomorrow's government spending, business spending,
and consumer spending must be foregone if the project is to be undertaken.
This includes those projects wherein no development actually takes place
but a transfer of water rights does.

Whether development or transfer

actua 11 y takes place or not, there is a current opportun i ty cost to those
who must give something up in order for others to gain and the full impacts
must be identified.
The exclusive application of a long-term real rate is inappropriate
because people will be impacted today should a change be made. As noted
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previously, past rates are irrelevant to the calculus except to the extent
that past rates can be used to predict future rates.

Furthermore, both

today's and tomorrow's rates should include consumption or investment
foregone in all three impacted sectors -- government, business, and
consumers.

The fact that nei ther governments nor most bus i ness actua 11 y

would have to forego anything unless the project were actually built would
perhaps suggest a stronger weighting toward the opportunity cost of
foregone consumer spending.
In much of the work that has been done in the past, there has been a
suggestion that an appropriate rate would be one that is comparable to the
long term real rate of return on publ ic investments (bonds, notes, etc.)
This rate ranges from 2-4% (Fraumeni and Jorgensen, 1980).
are several things wrong with this suggestion.

However, there

First, there is absolutely

no indication that the projects undertaken through such analyses are ....going
"...

to be less risky than those undertaken by the private sector.

In fact,

given that the final use of the water is unknown .at the time of the award
and the fact that the projects are generally new undertakings to the tribes
involved, there may be a val id argument that the project payoffs are even
more ri sky than other publ ic and private projects.

Second, in the final

analysis consumers must foregD consumption and businesses must foregone
investments if such projects (or transfers) are actually realized.

Third,

the long-term rates cited above include rates derived over periods of time
when many such rates were essentially controlled or regulated.

Hence, they

may not be an accurate refl ect i on of the true opportun i ty cost of
businesses, governments or consumers.

Reliance on a long-term real rate of

return to bus i ness or governments ignores the pri vate sector to a
significant degree and would understate the true opportunity cost of
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capital.

It might be argued that today's rate is high by historic

standards.

While that may be true, it should also be noted that a transfer

of water rights and/or approval of project development impacts
consumer as well as tomorrow's.

1Qda~

Hence, a present evaluation of current and

expected opportunity cost must be accounted for.
While the interest rate dilemma may seem insurmountable, federal
policy makers have provided an answer that presumably represents some
consensus of public opinion.

Since the 1960's, the federal government has

required the use of a discount rate consistent with the return on federal
borrowings, except that upward and downward adjustments in that rate cannot
exceed 1/4 of one percent for any year.

Consequently, during periods of

high inflation, the rate will not be that actually reflected in the market
but some additive amount of the preceding year's rate.

This tends to

ameliorate the impact of inflation while still allowing for today's
opportunity cost of capital to be reflected in the

calculatio~

Note that the suggest i on was made that th is approach refl ects some
consensus of public opinion.

In support of that statement, it should

suffice to suggest that the current standards have been subjected to years
of review and, yet, remained in place for nearly two decades.

Until this

consensus was developed, the method by whi ch the rate was determi ned and
changed was subject to numerous changes.

In fact, the same conceptual and

empirical issues raised in an evaluation of reserved water rights have been
discussed each time the general principles and standards have been opened
for review over the past two decades.

The rules remain virtually the same.

Yet, pressure for a low di scount rate cont i nues.

In most, if not all

development projects, the costs are incurred early in the project life
wh i 1 e the st ream of benefi ts do not occur unt ill ater in the 1 i fe of the
project. Consequently, the ratio of benefits to costs couldbe enhanced
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(i ncreased) if a lower di scount rate were used.

However, i ncreas i ng the

value of the benefit stream through the introduction of a lower discount
rate is not consistent with the notion and use of the true opportunity cost
of financial capital nor will that lower rate provide for a conservation of
resources.
A final empirical issue rests with the actually methodology employed
in the discounting and compounding process.

In traditional project

anal ys is, the flow of benefi ts and costs from all aspects of the proposed
project or development are brought to a common point in time for comparison
purposes.

For instance, if recreation and agriculture depend on the

completion

of a water storage facil ity, then the costs to construct the

facility are compounded until such time as the facility has been completed
and the benefits (and any other costs) are discounted back to this same
time peri od.

To compare costs at a speci fi c poi nt in time wi th benefi ts

at another poi nt in time as has been done in some reserved ri ght cases is
totally inconsistent with the logic of compounding/discounting.

A common

point of time comparison must be used because costs and benefits received
in different periods of time do not have the same value to us today.

Note

that this problem is particularly troublesome for multiple feature projects
such as dams which include cost and benefit components for irrigated
agriculture, recreation, flood prevention, and municipal and/or industrial
use.

Unless such costs and benefits are brought to a common point in time,

the resulting benefit-cost ratio is meaningless.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
It would seem appropriate to now summarize the application of economic
analysis to reserved water rights.

First, there may be some basis for

using practiably irrigable acreage as defined by appropriate economic
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analysis in determining a reserved water right because a similar process
would certainly have to be used were the Indians to compete for the water.
Historically, other members of our society had to demonstrate that the
water could be put to beneficial use before those rights could be captured.
Today, the standard of beneficial use is the primary criterion used to
establ ish or perfect water rights.

Hence, there is certainly some

historical basis for its use in the case of establishing reserved water
ri ghts.

More spec i fi call y, i rri gated agri cul tyure const i tuted the pri mary

use of water in those early days of development and would most likely have
been the basis for water rights quantification.

Second, the use of a

measure of economic feasibility establishes some limit to the claim for
reserved water rights.

Third, the use of economic feasibility establishes

a rul e for quant i fi cat i on that can be app 1 i ed to all concerned, provi ding
the specific analytical analyses are performed in an appropriate manner.
Finally, the use of a PIA standard using today's technologies almost
guarantees that the Tribe will receive more water than they would have had
rights been perfected during the time at which the reservation was
established.
Are there any reasons to suggest that PIA may not be the standard to
use as a measure of quant i fi cat ion?

Fi rst, under the current eva 1uat ion

procedures and practices (establish the right based on the purpose for
which the reservation was established), there is no guarantee that the
water will be put to the best use by society or the Indian tribe.

Second,

the use of a PIA standard may not provi de water to meet the "needs" of the
tribe in question.

For all of us, there is usually some divergence between

wants and needs and the PIA standard may either provide too much water for
meeting the tribe's needs or too 1 ittle water to meet those needs.
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The

PIA standard would, in all likelihood, never provide enough water to
satisfy wants.

Third, there is the potential that an award of water made

on the basis of economic feasibility to the tribes may exceed that which is
practicably even in the water shed.

Fourth, a claim based on PIA may

preclude every other non-Indian use, something which may be legally,
po 1it i call y, and econom i call y unpa 1atab 1e.

Furthermore, the use of a PIA

standard which would result in no award would likely be as unpalatable.
This last possibility, in our opinion, has not been given the servious
consideration that it merits.

If project infeasibility and a resulting

non-award is not acceptable to the parties involved in these matters, then
PIA and economi c feas i bi 1i ty are not useful measures.

In summary, there

are problems associated with the application of a PIA standard to the issue
of reserved water rights.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The. iss ue 0 f res e r ved wate r rig ht sis ext rem ely com p1ex.

Fro m the

litigation that has occurred thus far, there does appear to be a major role
for economic analysis in bringing about a resolution of the reserved water
rights issue.

There is little doubt but that the extent of the problem is

significant enough to warrant its examination.

For some states,

potential reserved water right claims exceed available supplies.

t~e

For other

states, even though the total claims are a small portion of the state's
water supplies, those supplies are fully appropriated.

Reserved water

rights can be granted only if someone else is denied their rights.
We have identified several conceptual and empirical issues which have
yet to be resolved in the resolution of the reserved rights question. Of
importance in the conceptual area are issues relating to economic and
financial analysis, questions of Pareto efficiency, impact on society's
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wealth when transfers are made, the issue of time, the role of beneficial
use in rights determination, the geographic distribution of benefits/costs,
the discount rate, the inclusion of secondary benefits/costs, and questions
of equity.

Empirical issues needing further discussion by economists and

clarification by the courts are the role and use of current, federally
mandated feasibility rules in actual rights determination, economic vs.
financial feasibility approaches, method of treating labor cost during
construction/operation, the type of activities that are appropriate to
include and the level that such activities can be introduced,

the

geographic extent or distribution of benefits and costs; the discount rate,
the discounting approach, the use of secondary benefits and costs, and the
"t i me" d i mens i on of app 1i cat i on of benefi ts and costs.
We would suggest the use of economic analysis can be an appropriate
tool in resolving this confl ict.

We would also suggest that until some

rules are establ ished which must be followed in determining "needs" or
"wants", conflicts associated with the litigation process will expand.
Even where a determination based on needs, we would expect the rules to be
challenged simply because the stakes are so high.
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